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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Apple iPad was the world’s leading tablet device in 2012.  
It commanded over 57 percent of the market worldwide.1 
However, despite the iPad’s popularity, Apple faced a major 
problem.  In China, Apple’s fastest growing market, Apple did not 
own the trademark to “iPad.”2  Another company did.3  That 
company, Proview Shenzhen, sued Apple for $1.6 billion (10 
billion yuan) in China—and both the trial court and appeals court 
agreed the case against Apple should proceed forward.4  Apple 
faced the daunting prospect of being unable to market the iPad in 
China under the trademark by which the rest of the world knew 
the device.  Even worse, Apple could have even faced a ban on all 
exports of the iPad to other parts of the world from China, where 
the iPad was manufactured.  To resolve this predicament, Apple 
eventually settled the case and paid Proview $60 million for the 
trademark rights to “iPad” in China.5 
Apple’s predicament is a company’s worst nightmare: 
developing a successful new product that runs up against 
someone else’s assertion of intellectual property (IP) in another 
part of the world, especially an important market.  This worst-case 
scenario is not uncommon in today’s global market.6  And it 
                                                          
1  See Josh Wolford, Android Tablets Grab 10% Market Share from Apple’s iPad, 
WEBPRONEWS (Jan. 27, 2012), android-tablets-grab-10-market-share-from-apples-
ipad-2012-01, http://www.webpronews.com/android-tablets-grab-10-market-
share-from-apples-ipad-2012-01 (“They [lost] about 10% of market share to 
Android OS . . . falling to 57.6% worldwide.”). 
2  See Wendy Li, Apple iPad Will Say Goodbye to Chinese Market Over Trademark 
Infringement?, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2012, 8:10 AM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/295075/20120208/apple-facing-huge-
challenge-chinese-company-demanded.htm (examining the allegations of 
trademark infringement against Apple in China). 
3  Id. 
4  See Kunal Dua, 10 Facts About Apple’s ‘iPad’ Battle in China, NDTV GADGETS 
(Feb. 8, 2012), http://gadgets.ndtv.com/tablets/news/10-facts-about-apples-
ipad-battle-in-china-224555 (discussing legal challenges for the iPad in China). 
5  Keith Bradsher, Apple Settles an iPad Dispute in China, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 
2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/02/business/global/apple-settles-an-ipad-
trademark-dispute-in-china.html?smid=pl-share (discussing the resolution of the 
iPad trademark dispute in China). 
6  See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, After Long Dispute, a Russian Starbucks, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/07/ 
business/worldbusiness/07sbux.html (explaining how a third party registered 
“Starbucks” in Russia, forcing Starbucks to litigate to obtain rights to the mark); 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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happens not just in trademark law, but also in patents.  For 
example, the global “smartphone wars” involving litigation over 
patents asserted around the world by the market leaders 
(including Apple, Google, and Samsung) against each other 
reflects the growing disconnect between markets and IP laws.7  Put 
simply, markets are global, but IP laws are not. 
Existing IP laws are legacies of a decision countries made over 
a century ago when they began formulating the first international 
intellectual property treaties in the late 1800s.8  In thinking how 
best to regulate IP internationally, countries naturally thought of 
the possibility of coming up with one universal system for the 
world, given the growth in international trade.  Eventually, 
countries nixed the idea, primarily because of the difficulty of 
reaching agreement on what the universal standard should be 
(each country favored its own approach).9  As a compromise, 
countries decided to keep a national territorial approach to IP laws 
under which rights are limited to each country’s borders and are 
decided by national laws that were subject to minimum standards 
of protection set by international treaties.  That fateful decision 
from the nineteenth century left a legacy of a territorial-based 
system of IP laws that has carried over to this day. 
This legacy has tradeoffs.  While the national territorial 
approach helps to preserve each country’s sovereignty and power 
to shape its own IP laws, potentially in ways different from other 
countries, territoriality also creates greater challenges and 
expenses for IP owners to secure protection internationally.  For 
example, IP owners must seek patents and trademarks for the 
same underlying invention or trademark in every country where 
                                                          
Kitsuron Sangsuvan, Trademark Squatting, 31 WIS. INT’L L.J. 252 (2013) (explaining 
how a Chinese company owns the trademark to “Weige,” the Chinese 
transliteration of “Viagra”).  The ongoing dispute over “Budweiser” beer between 
Anheuser-Busch and the Czech Budejovicky Budvar Company—a dispute that 
dates back over a century—provided an early glimpse of how territorial laws 
may be ineffective in handling global rights.  See Jitka Smith, Budweiser or 
Budweiser?, 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1251, 1252–56 (1999). 
7  Hon. Jimmie V. Reyna, The Tariff and the Patent: A New Intersection, 62 AM. 
U. L. REV. 779, 780 (2013). 
8  See SAM RICKETSON & JANE GINSBURG, 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND 
NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶ 2.24 (2005) 
(discussing the Berne Convention and other intellectual property treaties). 
9  See GRAEME B. DINWOODIE & ROCHELLE COOPER DREYFUSS, A NEOFEDERALIST 
VISION OF TRIPS: THE RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME 22–24 (2012) (evaluating the TRIPS agreement and its application). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/1
01_LEE (DO NOT DELETE) 10/13/2014  11:07 AM 
2014] THE GLOBAL TRADE MARK 921 
protection is sought.10  Sometimes, this process presents serious 
obstacles, as the Apple iPad case shows.  Moreover, even if 
successful in obtaining rights around the world, IP owners must 
enforce those rights on a country-by-country basis, even if a 
lawsuit involves the same parties and the same course of conduct 
in multiple countries.  Given the legacy of the territorial approach 
now embedded in the TRIPS Agreement for 159 World Trade 
Organization (WTO) countries,11 the idea of switching to a 
universal IP system seems remote, if not deleterious.  Yet, 
retaining the territorial approach for all IP laws in a global market 
seems questionable, not to mention inefficient.  As markets have 
become increasingly global in the twenty-first century, it is time to 
reconsider the idea of a universal system of IP, at least in some 
limited respects. 
This Article begins that undertaking.12  It offers a proposal for 
WTO countries to adopt global IP rights for a special class of 
trademarks:  famous or well-known marks.13  Well-known marks 
                                                          
10  By contrast, copyright law typically does not require any administrative 
formalities for authors to obtain copyrights for their works.  The Berne 
Convention prohibits countries from imposing such formalities on works of 
foreign origin.  See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works art. 5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, as revised July 24, 1971 and as amended Sept. 28, 
1979, 1161 U.N.T.S. 30 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (providing copyright 
protection on an international stage). 
11  Although territoriality is not expressly recognized in TRIPS, the 
Agreement is based on minimum standards that countries must implement 
through their own territorial laws.  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing 
the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments - Results of the 
Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  As of 
March 2013, the WTO had 159 members.  See Understanding the WTO: Members 
and Observers, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited 
March 1, 2014) (listing the 159 WTO members). 
12  It is worth noting that some ideas for a global patent system have been 
floated as not too fanciful.  See Three Heads, One Mind, THE IPKAT (Apr. 5, 2011), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2011/04/three-heads-one-mind.html (discussing 
view of then-U.S. Patent Office Director David Kappos). 
13  “Well-known” marks are trademarks that have a sufficient level of fame 
or recognition among the relevant public in a country, although the exact way or 
test to determine fame in what sector(s) is still a source of disagreement among 
countries.  See WIPO, PROTECTION OF WELL-KNOWN MARKS: RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
BY THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU AND PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF THE EXISTING 
SITUATION 6 (Nov. 13–16, 1995) [hereinafter WIPO WELL-KNOWN MARKS STUDY] 
(“[S]ince the Paris Convention itself does not define the conditions under which a 
trademark is to be considered well-known, considerable uncertainty exists as 
regards the circumstances under which a trademark owner can rely on Article 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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are well-suited for international protection, given the transnational 
protections for well-known marks that already exist under the 
Paris Convention and TRIPS Agreement.14  This Article proposes 
creating a Global Trade Mark (GTM) for well-known marks, to be 
governed by a uniform international law.  The GTM will span all 
countries in the WTO.  The GTM is inspired, in part, by the 
Community Trade Mark (CTM) in the European Union, the first 
truly transnational IP form.15  While the CTM is regional in scope 
(applying to all EU countries), the GTM will be international 
(applying to all WTO countries). 
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part 2 discusses the theory 
behind the Global Trade Mark and why it is worth adopting 
today.  Part 3 sketches the outlines of the proposed Global Trade 
Mark Treaty, whose signal feature will be to establish a uniform 
body of international law to govern the GTM and an International 
Court of the GTM to resolve conflicts over its interpretation.  Part 4 
discusses the two ways by which a trademark can be registered as 
a GTM:  (1) an international registration of an existing famous 
mark that is famous in a certain threshold number of countries or 
(2) an “intent-to-develop” registration of a mark an owner intends 
to make famous in the threshold number of countries within a 
prescribed time of 10 years.  Part 5 discusses enforcement of GTMs 
in national courts and post-registration issues, including 
exhaustion and exceptions to rights.  Of course, further details and 
amendments to the proposal will be required.  The proposal is 
meant as a starting point for WTO countries to study and debate a 
                                                          
6bis of the Paris Convention.”).  As explained below, well-known or famous 
marks receive special trademark protections, both in international and national 
trademark law.  See infra notes 37–42 and accompanying text.  In some countries, 
a “famous” mark is not the same thing as a “well-known” mark.  See WIPO WELL-
KNOWN MARKS STUDY, supra note 13, at 10.  However, it is common in 
international IP discussions to use the two interchangeably, and I will do so here 
unless differentiation is required.   
14  See Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property art. 6bis, 
Mar. 20, 1883, 24 U.S.T. 2140 (1967) [hereinafter Paris Convention] (protecting 
against the use of well-known marks found in other countries); TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 16(2), (3). 
15  See Council Regulation (EC) No. 40/94 of Dec. 20, 1993 on the Community 
Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11) 1, now replaced by Council Regulation (EC) No. 
207/2009 of Feb. 26, 2009 on the Community Trade Mark, 2009 O.J. (L 78) 1 
[hereinafter Community Trade Mark Regulation] (providing for protection of 
Community trademark).  For an assessment of the CTM system, see MAX PLANCK 
INST. FOR INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION LAW, STUDY ON THE OVERALL FUNCTIONING 
OF THE EUROPEAN TRADE MARK SYSTEM (Feb. 15, 2011).   
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/1
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global alternative to the current territorial approach to IP laws.  
More fundamentally, the proposal is intended as an example of 
how a global IP right might be crafted within the prevailing 
international IP system. 
2. THEORY:  TREATY DNA AND GLOBAL RIGHTS 
Part 2 develops the theory underlying the Global Trade Mark.  
In our global market, the GTM is an idea that is long overdue.  As 
explained below, the current approach to international IP 
replicates a patchwork design (territorial IP laws, subject to 
minimum standards) that may not be desirable in the long run for 
all international IP treaties.  The proposed system for a global 
trademark presents a good opportunity for countries to innovate, 
incrementally, the way in which intellectual property is protected 
internationally. 
2.1. The Typology of Treaties:  Analyzing “Treaty DNA” 
International treaties can be viewed along two planes:  (i) a 
vertical plane (or y-axis) represents the number of international 
rules that countries must follow in a particular area of law, and (ii) 
a horizontal plane (or x-axis) represents the flexibility and areas of 
discretion including minimum standards that countries may 
exercise in that area of law.16  Figure 1 below depicts the 
relationship. 
                                                          
16  Some of my ideas are inspired by the framework or terminology used by 
Dinwoodie and Dreyfuss, although their use of the terms “vertical” and 
“horizontal” is not exactly the same as I use here.  See DINWOODIE & DREYFUSS, 
supra note 9, at 15 (evaluating the TRIPS agreement and its application).  I borrow 
their use of “vertical” to describe international-to-national relationships.  
However, their use of “horizontal” applies to different international bodies and 
treaties that govern the same field.  I use the term “horizontal” to describe the 
level of flexibility countries are afforded by an international treaty.   
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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FIGURE 1.  BASIC MATRIX FOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES  
The higher one moves vertically on the y-axis, the more 
(substantial) requirements the treaty in question imposes.  
Conversely, a treaty with few requirements falls lower down on 
the y-axis.  The y-axis measures not just the number of 
requirements in the treaty, but also, more importantly, the breadth 
of those requirements in trying to regulate an entire field.  Broader 
international requirements are higher up, while narrower ones are 
lower down.  In addition, as depicted horizontally by the x-axis, 
the international requirements may allow greater or lesser 
discretion to countries.  The more discretion afforded to countries, 
the further to the right the treaty is located along the x-axis. 
Thus, an international treaty that attempted to establish an 
elaborate code of requirements for an entire field of regulation, 
with little discretion for countries, would be a “top down” body of 
law—more is done at the international level.  By contrast, an 
international treaty that had fewer requirements, with more 
discretion to countries, would be a “bottom up” body of law—
more is done at the national level. 
Consider two examples.  First, as depicted by the “Uniform” 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/1
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circle in Figure 1, a treaty that imposed many requirements to 
regulate in great detail a particular area of law, while allowing 
countries little discretion, would be situated higher along the y-
axis (symbolizing many requirements), and to the far left on the x-
axis (symbolizing little discretion).  In other words, the Uniform 
circle represents a “top down” approach, attempting to impose 
many specific requirements on countries. 
By contrast, as depicted by the “Flexible” circle, a treaty that 
imposed few requirements in a particular area of law and that 
allowed countries much discretion would be situated lower along 
the y-axis (few requirements) and to the far right of the x-axis 
(much discretion).  The Flexible circle represents a “bottom up” 
approach that achieves only modest harmonization among 
countries and imposes few specific requirements on them. 
Although this matrix is simplistic, it provides a way to 
conceptualize and visualize different types of international treaties 
and how they are framed—not just in IP, but also in other areas of 
law.  The primary benefit in using this matrix is that it allows 
systemic comparisons of different treaties in terms of their overall 
structure—analyzing the extent to which a treaty attempts to 
regulate a particular area of law and how much discretion it 
affords to countries. 
International treaties can thus be viewed as systems or 
archetypes—with a particular structure or internal makeup.  
Analyzing or mapping these structures or “treaty DNA,” so to 
speak, is helpful not only to commentators who study 
international treaties, but also to the international bodies that draft 
the treaties.  Just as scientists map the human DNA to develop 
gene therapy for diseases,17 legal commentators can map treaty 
DNA to develop better solutions for the regulation of global 
problems. 
2.2. TRIPS and the Legacy of Territorial IP Laws 
The structure of international intellectual property today is 
largely a legacy of the first international IP treaties dating back to 
the nineteenth century.  This legacy has resulted in relatively the 
same approach to international IP agreements:  territorial IP laws 
subject to some international minimum standards that leave a 
                                                          
17  See Jeremy A. Colby, Note, An Analysis of Genetic Discrimination Legislation 
Proposed by the 105th Congress, 24 AM. J.L. & MED. 443, 449 (1998) (discussing 
proposed legislation designed to prevent abuses of genetic information).  
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good deal of discretion among countries to decide (i) how the 
minimum standards should be interpreted and implemented, and 
(ii) how to address other areas not covered by the treaty.  The 
existing international IP agreements share, in other words, the 
same basic treaty DNA. 
Graphically, the substantive IP law treaties cluster in the 
middle of the matrix, as depicted below in Figure 2.  This is a 
crude representation, but nonetheless sufficient for our general 
purposes.  Except for the Paris Convention, (i) most of the 
substantive IP treaties have a fair number of international 
requirements for particular areas of law, but, at the same time, (ii) 
most allow a fair amount of discretion to countries to implement 
the minimum standards—not only above the standard, but also at 
the minimum and also where no minimum standard is required.  
The TRIPS Agreement, Berne Convention,18 Rome Convention,19 
and WIPO Treaties20 are all constructed in this fashion. 
Thus, I have placed TRIPS, Berne, Rome, and the WIPO 
                                                          
18  See Berne Convention, supra note 10.  The Berne Convention has 47 
articles total, plus an Appendix.  (Throughout, I have counted separately articles 
that are enumerated in the same sequence, such as bis, ter, quarter.)  Berne 
broadly regulates copyright subject matter, exclusive rights, term, moral rights, 
exceptions to the reproduction right, other exceptions, seizures, retroactivity, 
accession, and the Berne Union. 
19  See International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers 
of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43 
[hereinafter Rome Convention].  The Rome Convention has 34 articles.  It 
regulates the so-called “neighboring rights” for protection of performers, 
producers of phonograms or sound recordings, and broadcasting organizations.  
The Rome Convention, which applies only to performances, phonograms, and 
broadcasts, is narrower in coverage than the Berne Convention, so it is placed 
lower down along the y-axis in Figure 2. 
20  See WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, WIPO 
Doc. CRNR/DC/96, available at http:// www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ 
treaties/en/ip/wppt/pdf/trtdocs_wo034.pdf  [hereinafter WPPT]; WIPO 
Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997), WIPO Doc. CRNR/DC/96, 
available at http:// www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/treaties/ 
en/ip/wct/pdf/trtdocs_wo033.pdf [hereinafter WCT].  The WCT has only 25 
articles; it supplements the requirements of the Berne Convention.  One of the key 
provisions requires the adoption of anti-circumvention law.  See WCT at art. 12.  
In 2014, the WCT had 91 members.  See Contracting Parties, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=16 (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2014).  The WPPT has 33 articles that deal with protections for 
performers and producers of phonograms.  In 2014, the WCT had 92 members.  
See Contracting Parties, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id= (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
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Treaties as a cluster together near the center of the matrix.  
Although I have tried to position them accurately vis-à-vis each 
other, I am less concerned on getting correct their respective 
positions vis-à-vis each other.  The important lesson to draw from 
the matrix is that all of the agreements tend to share some of the 
same common features (or treaty DNA), as depicted by the 
clustering.  Each has a number of international minimum 
standards to regulate countries’ IP laws, but in a way that affords a 
fair amount of discretion to countries to implement the minimum 
standards.  TRIPS is, by far, the most comprehensive agreement 
covering, in 73 articles, 7 different areas of intellectual property—
copyright and related rights, trademarks, geographical indications, 
industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, 
and protection of undisclosed information.21  In addition, TRIPS 
also incorporates major sections of the Berne and Paris 
Conventions, and, to a lesser extent, the Rome Convention.22  
Accordingly, because TRIPS is the most detailed and 
comprehensive of all the IP treaties, it is the highest in the matrix. 
  
                                                          
21  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 1(2) (discussing the scope of 
“intellectual property”).   
22  See id. at arts. 2, 9(1), 14(6), 16 (establishing minimum standards for 
intellectual property regulation). 
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FIGURE 2.  MATRIX FOR INTERNATIONAL IP TREATIES   
 
 By contrast, the Paris Convention has relatively few minimum 
standards,23 so it is placed lower on the y-axis.  Under Paris, 
countries have a good deal of discretion in how they address the 
subject matter (primarily, trademarks and patents) under their 
own laws.  As depicted by the Paris circle above, a big variable 
that affects positioning vertically in the matrix is the number of 
requirements in the treaty.  One can break free of the cluster by 
having only a very few minimum standards, leaving most of the 
area of law unregulated by the treaty.  Indeed, the considerable 
discretion countries had especially in patent law under Paris led, 
in part, to the U.S. patent lobby’s successful efforts to obtain 
international standards for patents in the TRIPS Agreement.24  In 
                                                          
23  The Paris Convention has 46 articles total—8 of which specifically address 
patent issues (albeit in a narrow manner)—and 16 of which deal with trademarks.  
See generally Paris Convention, supra note 14 (creating protections for industrial 
property). 
24  See Brook K. Baker, Ending Drug Registration Apartheid: Taming Data 
Exclusivity and Patent/Registration Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 303, 313–14 (2008) 
(describing efforts of a coalition including pharmaceutical, software, 
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other words, the TRIPS Agreement effectively reined in the 
discretion for patent law afforded to countries by Paris and pulled 
international patent regulation back to the model set by the Berne 
and Rome Conventions.  The DNA for international IP treaties 
thus became even more homogeneous. 
The clustering effect depicted above should not be surprising.  
If all the IP treaties are using the same approach—international 
minimum standards implemented by territorial law—one would 
expect the level of discretion to be in the same general ballpark.  
Minimum standards afford some discretion to countries, as does 
the reliance on territorial laws.  Of course, discretion among 
countries is often considered to be beneficial to allow for some 
tailoring of IP laws to their particular socio-economic needs, 
culture, and circumstances. 
As depicted by the Madrid/PCT circle in Figure 2, the real 
outliers to the cluster are the administrative treaties governing 
trademark and patent applications—the Madrid System25 for 
trademarks and the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) for patents.26 
These procedural treaties establish a uniform, international 
application process that all member countries follow.  Madrid and 
                                                          
entertainment, and publishing companies in the U.S. to secure a global system of 
intellectual property protections). 
25  The Madrid System is composed of two alternative agreements: the 
Madrid Agreement and the Madrid Protocol.  The Madrid Agreement is the older 
of the two, but the less popular today.  See generally Madrid Agreement 
Concerning the International Registration of Marks, Apr. 14, 1891, as amended 
Sept. 28, 1979, 828 U.N.T.S. 389 [hereinafter Madrid Agreement] (providing a 
system for obtaining trademark registrations in different jurisdictions).  The 
Madrid Agreement has 27 articles and 46 rules.  See generally id.; Common 
Regulations Under the Madrid Agreement Concerning the International 
Registration of Marks and the Protocol Relating to that Agreement, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/legal_texts/common_regulations.htm 
[hereinafter Madrid Regulations] (providing rules governing Madrid 
Agreement).  The Madrid Protocol was adopted in 1989, but already has 83 
members.  See generally Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement Concerning 
the International Registration of Marks [hereinafter Madrid Protocol]; Contracting 
Parties, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=8  
(last visited Mar. 20, 2014).  The Madrid Protocol has 26 articles, plus the 46 rules 
that the Agreement shares in common.  Madrid Protocol, supra note 25; Madrid 
Regulations, supra note 25. 
26  The Patent Cooperation Treaty, originated in 1970, has 69 articles and 96 
rules.  See generally Patent Cooperation Treaty, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 
U.N.T.S. 231, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 978 (1970) (providing a unified procedure for 
filing patent applications in contracting states); Regulations Under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty, WIPO, available at http://www.wipo.int/pct/en/texts/rules/. 
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the PCT establish uniform formalities requirements, with little 
country-to-country discretion.  Given the lack of discretion 
(countries must accept the Madrid and PCT applications), the 
Madrid/PCT circle is placed to the far left on the x-axis.  However, 
since the requirements, though decent in number, regulate only 
the narrow area of formalities for a specialized international 
application process, the Madrid/PCT circle falls lower along the y-
axis.  By establishing a uniform international application process, 
both Madrid and the PCT are widely praised for the efficiencies 
they afford applicants in securing international protections (albeit 
still in the territorial or national approach to IP rights).27  Given the 
success of both the Madrid and PCT systems in producing an 
efficient, uniform application process, it is somewhat surprising 
that countries have not achieved any comparable consensus or 
uniform approach to any substantive IP law.  As depicted in 
Figure 2, Madrid and PCT are noticeable outliers. 
2.3. Why Lack of Diversity in IP Treaties Is a Problem 
The homogeneity in approach to substantive international IP 
treaties for over 130 years raises a problem.  The lack of diversity 
in the ways in which substantive international IP treaties are 
framed may hinder international progress in lawmaking, create 
and entrench inefficiencies in how IP is regulated and protected, 
and exacerbate errors (such as in over- or under-regulation) over 
time. 
2.3.1. Perpetuation of Old Legacy System 
Using only one approach for international IP law could be 
desirable if we can be confident that single approach works, and 
works well over time, for the welter of issues subject to IP laws.  
Unfortunately, that is not the case. 
First, the basic structure of today’s international IP treaties was 
developed 130 years ago—before mass communication, mass 
transportation, and the Internet.  What worked in 1880 may not 
                                                          
27  See David Lindsay Barch, Navigating the Madrid Protocol: A New Global 
Regime for the International Registration of Trademarks, 8 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 16, 16 
(2003) (“The Madrid Protocol is the latest in a succession of international efforts 
to create an efficient one-stop shop for the international registration of 
trademarks.”); Amir H. Khoury, The End of the National Patent Office, 52 IDEA 197, 
210 (2012) (“In essence, the PCT simplifies the application process relating to the 
international registration of patents and makes it cheaper and more efficient.”). 
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necessarily be as effective for the twenty-first century.  The global 
economy and growth of international trade have put significant 
pressures on territorially-based IP protections (as discussed in 
greater depth below), as have the growth of international 
counterfeiting and commercial infringement.  IP owners must 
adapt to the cost of obtaining and enforcing piecemeal protections 
by collecting national IP rights from different countries, subject 
potentially to varying standards in 150 plus countries.  Although 
the territorial approach to IP treaties has afforded countries a fair 
amount of national discretion, the price is that IP protection is 
harder to achieve internationally in today’s global market.  
Perhaps that tradeoff is one that all countries would continue to 
embrace, but the tension between global IP trade and territorially-
based IP laws raises a serious question about the overall 
performance of the current structure in international IP treaties. 
Second, we will never know whether some change might work 
better than the status quo, unless we have some alternative for 
comparison.  For example, the Framers of the U.S. Constitution 
had the lessons from the ineffective Articles of Confederation to 
draw upon in drafting the Constitution.28  Likewise, the United 
Nations had the failed League of Nations to build upon.29  And, in 
the context of trademarks, the EU first agreed to a Trademark 
Directive to harmonize national trademark laws in the EU (using 
the territorial approach), but, five years later, agreed to the 
Community Trade Mark, the first unitary regional IP form.30  In 
other words, we cannot know if a global IP system will work if it is 
never tried. 
The proposal in this Article is intended as a small, first foray 
                                                          
28  See Michael J. Teter, Recusal Legislating: Congress’s Answer to Institutional 
Stalemate, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2011) (explaining how the Framers of the 
Constitution sought to address the flaws of Congress under the Articles of 
Confederation). 
29  See Mark Angehr, The International Court of Justice’s Advisory Jurisdiction 
and the Review of Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1007, 1011 (2009) (stating that the failure of the League of Nations influenced 
the shaping and structure of the UN system). 
30  See First Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 40/1) (EC) 
(“Whereas the trade mark laws at present applicable in the Member States 
contain disparities which may impede the free movement of goods and freedom 
to provide services and may distort competition within the common market . . . it 
is therefore necessary . . . to approximate the laws of Member States”); 
Community Trade Mark Regulation, supra note 15 (“[T]rade marks should be 
created which are governed by a uniform Community law directly applicable to 
all Member States.”). 
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into unitary IP law in a limited area that is well-suited to a global 
approach.  The goal is not to displace the current territorial 
approach in favor of a unitary approach generally.  Indeed, given 
how extensively the TRIPS Agreement embeds the territorial 
approach in all corners of IP, the idea of switching to a universal 
approach seems far-fetched.  The current international IP regime 
can be likened to a legacy system that would cost too much to 
redesign or replace from scratch.  My proposal attempts to 
improve upon the current approach with a more diverse set of 
international structures or frameworks—a new kind of treaty 
DNA, so to speak, but in a very limited area.  Just as genetic 
diversity helps organisms avoid replication of deleterious traits 
and even outright extinction, so too does having diversity in legal 
approaches to regulate conduct in a fast-changing world.31 
2.3.2. Inefficiencies of Territorial IP in Global Market 
A major downside to the territorial approach to IP protection is 
that, while preserving a country’s flexibility and sovereignty, it 
may make more difficult and less efficient the protection of IP 
internationally.  The difficulties are exacerbated especially when 
the underlying infringing activity spans several countries—and 
would be considered infringing by all affected countries.  For 
example, imagine if twenty countries around the world all would 
deem the same defendant to have violated anti-counterfeiting laws 
by producing and selling fake Tag Heuer watches.  Under the 
current approach, Tag Heuer, the trademark holder, would still 
have to bring twenty separate lawsuits in twenty different 
countries.  Although there is no conflict of law (the result of 
liability is the same under any national law), the trademark holder 
must nevertheless still bring multiple suits around the world and 
seek separate enforcement.  The high cost of duplicative lawsuits is 
an inefficient allocation of resources for both the IP owners and the 
various national courts.32  
                                                          
31  Cf. Marjorie D. Matocq & Francis X. Villablanca, Low Genetic Diversity in 
an Endangered Species: Recent or Historic Pattern?, 98 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 61, 
61 (2001) (discussing the detrimental effects of a reduction in a population’s 
genetic diversity). 
32  See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts 
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 541 n.223 (2000) (“[S]trict 
adherence to territoriality would cause inefficient serial national litigation of 
almost identical issues”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie et al., The Law Applicable to 
Secondary Liability in Intellectual Property Cases, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 201, 212 
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Likewise, territoriality may cause distortions in investments 
and create incentives for inefficient allocation of resources.  For 
example, in the bankruptcy context, Lucian Bebchuk and Andrew 
Guzman have shown how a system following a territorial 
approach to bankruptcies of a business with transnational 
bankruptcies—allowing the bankruptcy to be decided in multiple 
jurisdictions—produces distortions and inefficient allocation of 
capital ex ante.33  Specifically, some “[f]irms will . . . choose not to 
invest in the country offering the greatest return on investment, 
accepting instead a lower return in exchange for a lower interest 
rate on loans.”34 
Although more study is needed in the IP context, perhaps a 
similar kind of distortion occurs here.  Some IP owners may 
under-invest in IP creation or the optimal level of IP protection for 
their creations in certain markets, given the expensive, piecemeal 
territorial approach to IP or difficulties of enforcing IP rights.  
Conversely, other IP owners may over-invest in order to 
compensate for the piecemeal, territorial approach to IP, such as 
by devoting massive and at times redundant resources to fight 
infringement and IP disputes in countries around the world. 
2.3.3. Errors Are Repeated at Global Level 
A final reason to question the current approach to international 
                                                          
(2009) (“This approach recognizes that, despite historical commitments to 
territoriality, the application of numerous national laws to conduct that bears no 
overriding connection to a single state is not only inefficient but arguably also 
relatively weak in prescriptive legitimacy.”).  A similar concern arises in other 
contexts.  See Paul B. Stephan, Global Governance, Antitrust, and the Limits of 
International Cooperation, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 173, 208 (2005) (“[A] universal 
commitment to territoriality would prevent a state from regulating offshore 
producers intending to limit competition in the state’s market, thus creating 
inefficiencies.  Barring all such desirable regulation can be justified only if one can 
demonstrate that on balance extraterritorial regulation would decrease welfare.”). 
33  See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of 
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J.L. & ECON. 775, 775 (1999) (“Territoriality is shown 
to generate a distortion in investment patterns that might lead to an inefficient 
allocation of capital across countries.”).  But see Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for 
Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2226 
(2000) (describing the difficulty in identifying the home country of debtors for 
bankruptcy purposes); Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational 
Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 5 (1997) (arguing that to promote efficiency, 
firms should be allowed to choose a set of bankruptcy rules to use in case of 
financial distress at the time of their incorporation). 
34  Bebchuk & Guzman, supra note 33, at 779. 
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IP agreements is that such redundancy in approach will likely 
reproduce any shortcomings or errors in the approach itself.  As 
discussed in the previous section, the territorial approach to IP 
increases enforcement and judicial costs for transnational suits 
involving the same course of conduct.  If all IP treaties have the 
same territorial approach, the inefficiencies produced by 
piecemeal IP protection are compounded and repeated—in 
copyright law, patent law, trade secret law, trademark law, and 
other IP laws.  To the extent international IP agreements all 
instantiate the same territorial approach, the inefficiencies become 
universalized.  Would-be infringers are able to exploit these 
longstanding deficiencies, much in the same way bacteria become 
resistant to the same antibiotics if used over and over again.  For 
example, counterfeiters can locate their illegal operations offshore 
in countries with lax trademark enforcement and thereby escape 
the territorial reach of other countries. 
In the face of imperfect information about the best 
international system of IP,35 relying on a single approach in 
international IP agreements increases the potential magnitude of 
any systemic error.  Instead of a systemic error localized to one 
treaty (such as for copyright law), the error becomes replicated in 
all signatory countries in all IP treaties with the same DNA or 
approach (such as for patent law, trade secret law, and trademark 
law).  Of course, this fear of reproducing errors occurs with global 
laws as well—”[a] single bad rule that applies worldwide carries 
much greater potential harm than a single bad rule that applies to 
just one country.”36  My proposal for a universal approach is not 
immune from this concern.  Ameliorating the inefficiencies of the 
territorial approach by a universal system may produce other side 
effects that require addressing.  However, one way to deal with 
this danger is to limit the global approach to a narrow area, in 
order to test its effectiveness, as proposed by this Article.  My 
                                                          
35  See generally Edward Lee, The New Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law to 
Decide Domestic Intellectual Property Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 21–22 (2005) 
(discussing when and how U.S. courts might rely on foreign authorities in 
deciding IP cases).  
36  Id. at 21.  Although in my prior scholarship I have emphasized the 
importance of having diversity in IP approaches at the national level, my position 
here does not negate that goal.  Instead, my proposal for a narrow class of global 
trademark is meant to be integrated within the current system of international IP 
treaties, nearly all of which are predicated on minimum standards that afford 
countries a fair amount of discretion in their national laws.   
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proposal is incremental and is meant to be incorporated alongside 
existing international IP treaties that take a territorial approach.  If 
so adopted, the proposal will provide greater diversity to the ways 
in which countries protect IP rights internationally. 
2.4. Why Well-Known Marks Are Suited for Global Rights 
Proposals for developing a unitary, global law should be 
treated with caution, if not skepticism.  Well-known marks, 
however, present a narrow area that may be better suited for 
developing a global law. 
2.4.1. Limited Class of “Super” Well-Known Marks 
One reason why the proposed Global Trade Mark offers a 
good opportunity to attempt a unitary international IP approach is 
that it would govern a very narrow class of marks that are well-
known in a threshold number of countries around the world, at 
least in three continents (as discussed in Parts 3 and 4).  The 
narrow class of marks eligible for the GTM would be “super” well-
known marks that are famous in a sizeable portion of the world.  
Thus, relatively few trademarks in the world would qualify for the 
GTM.  As a first foray into global IP rights, it is attractive to begin 
with a relatively small class of subject matter.  In other words, the 
GTM would deal with global marks—which are a good fit for 
global lawmaking. 
If we situate the GTM on our treaty matrix, it would fall to the 
far left of the x-axis (allowing little discretion to countries), but 
only modestly up the y-axis (although above the Madrid/PCT 
circle), indicating that the GTM imposes uniform substantive law 
requirements only for a limited field of trademarks.  From an 
international perspective, the benefit of the GTM is that it would 
be the first real attempt in the left side of the matrix—establishing 
a uniform substantive IP law, but only in a narrow area. 
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FIGURE 3.  THE GLOBAL TRADE MARK ON THE TREATY MATRIX 
2.4.2. Existing Special International Protections for Well-Known 
Marks 
Another reason the proposed Global Trade Mark presents a 
good area for developing a global system of IP law is that well-
known marks already receive special international protections 
under the Paris Convention and TRIPS.  These special protections 
help well-known marks attain international reach, even without 
use or registration in a country. 
Article 6bis of the Paris Convention effectively requires 
countries to recognize and to give priority to trademarks that are 
well-known in their borders, irrespective of registration and use.37  
A well-known trademark has priority over third-party uses of the 
mark on identical or similar goods.38  While countries normally 
                                                          
37  See Paris Convention, supra note 14, at art. 6bis (protecting against the use, 
in any country party to the Convention, of a trademark which constitutes a 
“reproduction, an imitation, or a translation“ of a well-known mark found in that 
country). 
38  Id. 
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require either registration or use as a prerequisite to obtaining 
trademark rights, neither can be required if the mark is already 
famous in the country.39  The fame of the mark acts effectively as a 
surrogate for registration or use. 
Article 16(2) of TRIPS extends the protections of Article 6bis of 
Paris to service marks, in addition to providing some guidelines 
on what factors should be considered in determining whether a 
mark is well-known.40  Article 16(3) of TRIPS extends Paris Article 
6bis protection to registered well-known marks; the protection 
extends “to goods or services which are not similar to those in 
respect of which a trademark is registered, provided that use of 
that trademark in relation to those goods or services would 
indicate a connection between those goods or services and the 
owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests 
of the owner of the registered trademark are likely to be damaged 
by such use.”41  The precise meaning of Article 16(3) has been the 
source of contention among countries—some countries like the 
U.S. argue that it requires protection against dilution of well-
known marks, while other countries like Australia argue that it 
requires protection only against likelihood of confusion with well-
known marks.42  Regardless of the controversy over TRIPS Article 
16(3), TRIPS and Paris offer heightened protections for well-
known marks.  These special protections allow well-known marks 
to qualify for trademarks around the world, simply based on the 
fame of the mark within respective countries. 
Thus, the more famous the mark around the world, such as 
Coca-Cola, the more likely it will have trademark protection in all 
countries in the WTO simply by being famous.  In this respect, the 
                                                          
39  See WIPO WELL-KNOWN MARKS STUDY, supra note 13, at 4–5 (stating that 
Article 6bis can be invoked where a “trademark is registered but not—or not 
sufficiently—used in the country, and there is no justification for the failure to 
use” in order to “ensure protection for the trademark, provided it is well known 
in the country”). 
40  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 16(2) (“In determining 
whether a trademark is well-known, Members shall take account of the 
knowledge of the trademark in the relevant sector of the public, including 
knowledge of the Member concerned which has been obtained as a result of the 
promotion of the trademark.”). 
41  Id. at art. 16(3) (emphasis added). 
42  See Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations to Protect 
Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405, 432 (2010) (explaining that some WTO 
members, including Australia, advocated for more narrow obligations under 
Article 16(3)). 
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current Paris and TRIPS protections for well-known marks can be 
viewed as precursors to the proposed Global Trade Mark.  As 
Frederick Mostert suggests, we are already down the path of a 
global trademark based on “a common set of principles, in effect a 
ius gentium [that] has developed around famous and well-known 
marks, which can serve as a basis for a harmonized global 
approach in conformity with the needs of contemporary 
commerce.”43  Given these existing protections for well-known 
marks, the proposed treaty would not be too radical of a change 
for countries to adopt. 
3. PROPOSAL:  THE GLOBAL TRADE MARK TREATY 
This Part outlines the institutional design of the proposed 
Global Trade Mark Treaty as an agreement within the WTO.  The 
Treaty is intended to create an international registration system to 
be administered by the International Bureau (IB) of the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and a uniform body of 
law for Global Trade Marks.   
3.1.  WTO and WIPO Joint Oversight 
As the preferred route, the Global Trade Mark Treaty will be 
proposed as a WTO agreement.  The advantage of operating under 
the auspices of the WTO is twofold:  first, the WTO has 159 
members (thereby ensuring a near global scope to protection); and, 
second, the WTO has an established Dispute Settlement Body to 
handle disputes among countries related to enforcement and 
implementation of the treaty.44  Empirical studies show that the 
DSB has been fairly successful in resolving IP disputes among 
countries and in encouraging countries to fix violations of their 
international obligations.45 
A goal of the GTM Treaty would be to combine institutional 
                                                          
43  FREDERICK W. MOSTERT, FAMOUS AND WELL-KNOWN MARKS: AN 
INTERNATIONAL ANALYSIS, at xxxi (2d ed. 2004). 
44  See Geraldo Vidigal, From Bilateral to Multilateral Law-Making: Legislation, 
Practice, Evolution and the Future of Inter Se Agreements in the WTO, 24 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 1027, 1029 (2013) (highlighting how the involvement of the WTO transforms 
“bilateral logic,” which normally underlies state relations, into a more fluid type 
of “multilateral logic”). 
45  See Edward Lee, Measuring TRIPS Compliance and Defiance: The WTO 
Compliance Scorecard, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 401, 411–12 (2011) (proposing the use of 
a TRIPS Compliance Scorecard to rate a country’s attempts to correct its alleged 
treaty violations). 
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features of both the WTO and the International Bureau of WIPO to 
administer the GTM.  The WTO would handle primarily dispute 
resolution among countries (as it does for the TRIPS Agreement 
and other WTO agreements), while the IB of WIPO would handle 
registration of GTMs by trademark holders, given the IB’s 
expertise in administering international registrations under the 
Madrid System.46  WIPO already has a searchable online database 
of international registrations under Madrid (an application system 
that is still predicated on territorial, national rights).47  The idea 
would be to expand that Madrid database to include new GTM 
registrations—establishing, for the first time, an international 
database of global marks.   
Of course, WIPO is a separate entity (a specialized agency of 
the United Nations) from the WTO,48 so the proposed joint effort 
between the WTO and WIPO would take coordination.  But, as 
other scholars have recognized, greater collaboration between 
WTO and WIPO would be fruitful and desirable in developing 
international IP.49 
The GTM Treaty would not displace the current Madrid 
System.  Instead, the GTM would operate alongside the Madrid 
System, adding an extra level of registration and protection for a 
special class of global marks.  Trademark holders would still be 
able to utilize the Madrid System.  Indeed, given the high 
threshold for trademarks to qualify for GTM status (discussed in 
Part 4), one would expect that most trademark holders would opt 
to use the Madrid System in order to attain international 
registrations of their marks in various countries. 
                                                          
46  See The International Application, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/madrid/en/general/#intapp (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) 
(summarizing requirements for rendering international applications under the 
Madrid System). 
47  See Madrid: The International Trademark System, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/romarin (last visited Jan. 20, 2014) (providing searchable 
database of international registrations). 
48  What is WIPO?, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/about-wipo/en/ (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
49  See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Designing a 
Global Intellectual Property System Responsive to Change: The WTO, WIPO, and 
Beyond, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1187, 1192–96 (2009) (forwarding suggestions regarding 
the design of a more comprehensive and responsive intellectual property system). 
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3.2. Global Rights and Unitary International Law 
3.2.1. Recognizing a Global Trade Mark 
The defining feature of the Global Trade Mark is that it would 
establish one “global” trademark that would be effective in all 159 
countries of the World Trade Organization.  Although the GTM 
would be limited to a very narrow class of “super” well-known 
marks (as determined by a formula discussed in Part 4), once a 
mark qualified for GTM registration, it would automatically 
receive protection in all member countries around the world.  In 
short, a single GTM registration would preserve the GTM owner’s 
rights in all countries as a unitary global right.50 
The GTM will recognize three basic causes of actions:  (1) 
trademark infringement, (2) dilution in countries where fame of 
the mark is established, and (3) counterfeiting.  Actions against 
counterfeiting and trademark infringement (based on likelihood of 
confusion) are required already by TRIPS, so their inclusion in the 
GTM Treaty should not raise controversy.51  But countries disagree 
whether TRIPS requires actions against dilution of registered well-
known marks under Article 16(3),52 and the expansion of dilution 
claims has generated criticism among some trademark scholars.53  
However, at least some of these criticisms would be vitiated by 
setting a very high standard to qualify for a “super” well-known 
mark under the GTM Treaty.54  The GTM Treaty could also 
include special protections for GTMs as used in domain names.  
For example, with coordination with ICANN, the Uniform 
                                                          
50  Should a GTM owner choose to give up all of its prior national 
registrations, the GTM would still operate to protect and preserve the rights to 
the mark in all of those countries. 
51  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at arts. 16(1), 61 (providing that the 
owner of a registered trademark may prevent third parties from using identical 
or similar signs to those in respect of which the trademark is registered). 
52  See supra note 42 and accompanying text (noting that some states do not 
confer a broad anti-dilution right on the holders of well-known marks). 
53  See, e.g., Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the 
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789 (1997) (examining the 
importance and simultaneous fragility of trademarks).  
54  Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1704 (1999) (dilution should be limited to truly famous 
marks because “preventing dilution in appropriate cases will lessen aggregate 
consumer confusion and thus encourage investment in the quality of the 
underlying product”). 
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Domain-Name Dispute Resolution policy55 could be amended to 
include a specific provision prohibiting registration of a domain 
name by third parties consisting solely of a GTM in any second-
level or top-level domain (including new top-level domains 
approved by ICANN). 
Another major benefit of the GTM is enforcement:  GTM 
owners can bring enforcement actions against international 
infringement in one jurisdiction and obtain international remedies.  
To return to the counterfeit Tag Heuer watch example, if Tag 
Heuer qualified for a GTM, it could sue the counterfeiter in one 
country and receive an injunction that covered the 20 countries 
where the defendant had been selling counterfeit Tag Heuer 
watches.  Thus, in terms of both registration and enforcement, the 
GTM would be more efficient than the current piecemeal approach 
under TRIPS.  All that is needed is one court to enforce a 
registered GTM internationally. 
3.2.2. Establishing a Uniform International Law 
Another defining feature of the GTM Treaty is that it would 
establish—for the first time in history—a unitary body of 
international IP law that would, at least in theory, be uniform 
across all jurisdictions.  Of course, establishing a uniform body of 
international law is easier said than done.  But, as explained 
below, the institutional design of the GTM will be set up to 
maximize the possibility of achieving a uniform approach. 
One way to minimize the prospect of conflict among countries 
is to draft the GTM Treaty with greater specificity, particularly on 
key issues, such as what constitutes a well-known mark.  The goal 
would not be to draft minimum standards that allow countries the 
chance for divergent views—the territorial approach of TRIPS, the 
Paris Convention, and the Berne Convention.  Instead, the goal 
would be to draft specific rules for how the GTM will operate for 
uniform application.  The Treaty will enumerate the standards for 
proving trademark infringement, dilution, and counterfeiting, as 
well as fair use, generic marks, and other defenses.  And, as 
discussed below, the new International Court of the GTM will 
provide authoritative interpretations of the Treaty.56 
                                                          
55  See Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, ICANN, 
http://www.icann.org/en/udrp/udrp.htm (offering a synopsis of the Dispute 
Resolution Policy). 
56  For a helpful discussion on what the test might consider, see infra note 72; 
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3.2.3. The International Court of the Global Trade Mark (ICGTM) 
The limits of language make it difficult, if not impossible, to 
avoid some uncertainty and disagreement over the application of 
treaty provisions to future circumstances.  Thus, critical to the 
success of establishing a uniform international law would be to 
have an institution that would resolve any conflicts in 
interpretation of the treaty among countries and that would be the 
final authority on the meaning of the treaty. 
The GTM Treaty will establish the International Court of the 
Global Trade Mark (ICGTM), to be seated in Geneva, Switzerland.  
WTO Members would nominate qualified judges and lawyers 
from their countries to serve on the ICGTM; each country can 
nominate only one person.  Based on a vote of the WTO, five 
ICGTM judges would be selected to serve for four years.  All five 
judges would hear cases involving interpretation of the Treaty.  
Decisions would be made by majority vote and would be 
precedential within the ICGTM—meaning past interpretations by 
the ICGTM would be binding in future cases unless the Court 
voted to overrule its earlier decision. 
The ICGTM would have jurisdiction over interpretation of the 
GTM Treaty based on a national referral system.  In this regard, 
the ICGTM would operate similarly to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU), which provides uniform interpretations 
of EU law based on referrals from national courts in EU 
countries.57  The ICGTM would decide questions of interpretation 
of the Treaty referred by national courts in WTO countries.  A 
WTO member itself could refer a question related to a final 
decision of a national court involving interpretation of the GTM 
Treaty.  The ICGTM would be required to review any referral by a 
national court or a country. In either type of referral, the ICGTM 
would decide or resolve only legal issues (but not factual issues).  
The Court’s interpretation of the Treaty would be authoritative. 
                                                          
WIPO Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-
Known Marks, Sept. 20–29, 1999, WIPO Publication 833(E), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/development_iplaw/pub833-
01.htm#P59_2888; see also Leah Chan Grinvald, A Tale of Two Theories of Well-
Known Marks, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1, 22 (2010) (discussing establishment of 
fame through consumer “passive perception” versus consumer “interaction”). 
57  See Juscelino F. Colares, The Reality of EU-Conformity Review in France, 18 
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 369, 371 (2012) (explaining how EU-conformity review emerged 
and analyzing whether EU supremacy theories spawn different conformity 
adjudication results). 
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The ICGTM would also have discretionary jurisdiction to 
review appeals filed by parties from decided cases involving GTM 
claims in national courts.  The discretionary authority to review 
appeals in actual disputes would be similar to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s discretionary authority to grant petitions for writ of 
certiorari.58  Thus, if a designated national court made an 
egregious legal error or misapplication of GTM law, the 
International Court would have the discretionary power to review 
and reverse the error. 
3.2.4. Dispute Resolution:  WTO DSB to Resolve Challenges 
Finally, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) will resolve 
disputes brought by countries as to the enforcement and 
implementation of the GTM Treaty in countries.  If a member fails 
to implement the Treaty, or repeatedly rejects or misapplies an 
interpretation of the Treaty by the ICGTM, other members would 
be able to bring a challenge before the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Body.  A violation of the ICGTM would be handled in the same 
way as any other violation of other WTO agreements—with the 
possibility of trade sanctions being authorized against non-
compliant countries as a last resort.59  The institutions involved in 
interpreting and enforcing the GTM Treaty would help to ensure, 
as best as reasonably possible, that it is applied in a uniform 
manner among countries. 
4. GTM REGISTRATION:  THE TWO PATHWAYS TO OBTAINING A 
GLOBAL TRADE MARK 
Part 4 outlines two pathways of registration by which 
trademark holders can register a GTM.  Pathway 1 is for 
trademarks that are already well-known in several countries.  
Pathway 2 is for new trademarks or trademarks that are not yet 
well-known.  Each pathway is discussed in turn. 
                                                          
58  See Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme Court: An 
Empirical Analysis, 102 GEO. L.J. 271, 273 (2013) (describing how, in the absence of 
a circuit split, the Supreme Court decides which Federal Circuit cases merit 
review). 
59  See Lee, supra note 45, at 405–08 (explaining how the Dispute Settlement 
Body (DSB) operates to enforce compliance with international obligations). 
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4.1. ELIGIBLE MARKS:  WORD MARKS, LOGOS, AND COMPOSITES 
Before discussing how entities can obtain a Global Trade Mark, 
one important limitation should be noted.  At the inception of the 
GTM Treaty, only word marks (including stylized word marks), 
logos or devices, and composites of word marks and logos would 
be eligible for registration as a GTM.  However, trade dress and 
so-called non-traditional marks60 (sound, smell, color alone, three-
dimensional items, touch, motion, etc.) would not be eligible for 
GTM registration.  The reason for excluding trade dress and non-
traditional marks is to minimize disagreement among countries on 
whether the mark should be protectable or not.  All WTO 
countries recognize word marks and logos as trademarks.61  But 
countries diverge on how, if at all, trade dress and non-traditional 
marks should be protected.62 
Another reason to limit the field of eligible marks is 
administrative:  in implementing the new GTM system, the 
International Bureau and national trademark offices designated to 
review GTM applications should be given an easier task at the 
start.  Search capabilities for nontraditional marks—such as smell, 
taste, and motion—are not as effective as they are for text or 
words.  In the future, the WTO might consider opening up the 
GTM to trade dress or non-traditional marks, but only after seeing 
how well or poorly the GTM system worked with basic word 
marks and logos. 
4.2. Pathway 1:  Graduation of Existing Well-Known or Famous 
Marks 
The Global Trade Mark will be limited to a class of marks that 
are well-known in numerous countries—the idea being that GTMs 
should be reserved for marks that are global in recognition among 
                                                          
60  See Anne Gilson LaLonde & Jerome Gilson, Getting Real with 
Nontraditional Trademarks: What’s Next After Red Oven Knobs, the Sound of Burning 
Methamphetamine, and Goats on a Grass Roof?, 101 TRADEMARK REP. 186 (2011) 
(discussing U.S. approach to nontraditional marks). 
61  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 15 (setting forth trademark 
subject matter). 
62  See THOMAS P. ARDEN, PROTECTION OF NONTRADITIONAL MARKS: 
TRADEMARK RIGHTS IN SOUNDS, SCENTS, COLORS, MOTIONS AND PRODUCT DESIGN IN 
THE U.S. (2000); Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something New, Something 
Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark Registrations, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 464–95 (2005) (discussing EU and U.S. approach to 
nontraditional marks). 
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the public.  The following section explains a threshold requirement 
of fame that trademark owners must meet in order to register a 
GTM. 
4.2.1. Threshold Requirement:  The Rule of 7 
Under Pathway 1, well-known marks can “graduate” to Global 
Trade Mark status upon proof that the mark is well-known in a 
certain threshold number of countries.  The Global Trade Mark is 
reserved for those trademarks that can considered in some sense 
“global” in reach.  The exact threshold can be set after debate and 
deliberation by the WTO.  For illustrative purposes, this Article 
offers the following formula, called “the Rule of 7.”  Under the 
Rule of 7, the trademark holder must establish a well-known mark 
in 7 of the Top 30 nations in GDP at the time of filing as 
determined by the International Monetary Fund (the list from two 
years previous would be used for all filings within the calendar 
year).  The 7 countries must be from the following 2 sets of 
countries: 
(a) Category A:  The trademark holder must establish a 
well-known mark in at least 2 of the Top 4 countries or 
entities in terms of GDP (the EU, U.S., China, and Japan in 
2012), and 
(b) Category B:  The trademark holder must establish a 
well-known mark in at least 5 of the Top 5 through 30 GDP 
countries (a country in the Top 4 countries can also be used 
here if not used to satisfy Category A).63 
In addition, to satisfy the requirements of Categories A and B, 
the Rule of 7 requires that the 7 countries chosen must span at 
least 3 continents—a number that probably would be expected in 
any event, given the current break down of Top 30 GDP countries.  
In order to avoid double counting, if one of the Top 4 countries 
                                                          
63  In 2012, the Top 31 GDP countries or trading areas were: (1) EU, (2) U.S., 
(3) China, (4) Japan, (5) Germany, (6) France, (7) UK, (8) Brazil, (9) Russia, (10) 
Italy, (11) India, (12) Canada, (13) Australia, (14) Spain, (15) Mexico, (16) South 
Korea, (17) Indonesia, (18) Turkey, (19) Netherlands, (20) Saudi Arabia, (21) 
Switzerland, (22) Sweden, (23) Norway, (24) Poland, (25) Belgium, (26) Argentina, 
(27) Taiwan, (28) Austria, (29) South Africa, (30) United Arab Emirates, and (31) 
Venezuela.  See List of Countries by GDP (Nominal), WIKIPEDIA, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal) [hereinafter 
2012 GDP list] (collecting data from IMF and other institutions) (last visited Jan. 
20, 2014).  
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relied on by the trademark owner is the EU, EU countries could 
not also be used to meet the threshold in Category B.64  Because 
some of the countries in Category B are from the EU, an additional 
country from the GDP list (Venezuela) will be added in order to 
increase the options available to GTM applicants. 
 
Rule of 7 - Top 30 GDP Countries (2012) 
Category A Category B 
  EU Germany 
  United States France 
  China United Kingdom 
  Japan Brazil 




















 South Africa 
 United Arab Emirates 
 Venezuela 
 
                                                          
64  If a country listed in the Top 30 GDP countries is not a member of the 
WTO (such as Iran), that country is excluded from the list of qualifying countries 
and the next country on the list of Top 30 GDP countries is included. 
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Consider the following example of how a trademark owner 
could satisfy the Rule of 7.  Coca-Cola can satisfy the Rule of 7 by 
having a well-known mark in the U.S. and EU (2 from Category 
A), plus in Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Australia, and South Korea (5 
from Category B).  The trademark “Coca-Cola” is already well-
known in many countries around the world, but the trademark 
owner would only need to prove its mark is well-known in 7 
countries.65 
Likewise, Samsung might satisfy the Rule of 7 by establishing 
that it has a well-known mark in China and Japan (2 from 
Category A), plus the U.S., South Korea, India, Indonesia, and UK 
(5 from Category B).66  Louis Vuitton might prove that it has a 
well-known mark in the U.S. and Japan (2 from Category A), plus 
Germany, France, UK, Italy, and Spain (5 from Category B).67  In 
each of these examples, the well-known trademark can “graduate” 
to Global Trade Mark status and obtain GTM registration upon 
submission of evidence of fame to satisfy the Rule of 7. 
Using a formula like the Rule of 7 has several advantages.  
First, the formula can help to identify marks that are famous in 
several large GDP countries around the world.  The trademark 
holder would have to prove well-known status in 3 different 
continents, if not more.  Thus, under the Rule of 7, a trademark 
holder would be required to show well-known status in parts of at 
least 50% of the continents of the world (excluding Antarctica).  
This requirement would help to screen out those marks whose 
fame was only regional. 
Second, the Rule of 7 targets fame in the Top 30 GDP countries, 
meaning those countries that produce the greatest market value in 
goods and services.  Establishing well-known trademarks in 2 of 
the Top 4 GDP countries and 5 of the other Top 30 countries serves 
as a reasonable proxy for the strength of the consumer recognition 
that the trademark in question has around the world.  The Top 30 
GDP countries (excluding the EU and including Venezuela instead 
of Iran) represent over 86 percent of the world’s total GDP.68  Thus, 
                                                          
65  In 2013, “Coca-Cola” was ranked as the third most valuable brand in the 
world.  See Stephen Shankland, Apple Bumps Coca-Cola to Become World’s Top 
Brand, CNET (Sept. 30, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-13579_3-57605207-
37/apple-bumps-coca-cola-to-become-worlds-top-brand/ (assessing the value of 
brands). 
66  Samsung was ranked No. 8 in the world in terms of brand value.  Id. 
67  Louis Vuitton was ranked No. 17 in the world in terms of brand value.  Id. 
68  The numbers are based on calculations from the IMF GDP figures for 2012 
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the Rule of 7 would require the trademark holder to establish well-
known status of its mark in markets representing, at a minimum, 
22 percent of the world’s total GDP.69  And if the U.S. is one of the 
countries used to satisfy the Rule of 7, the trademark holder would 
have to establish well-known status in markets representing at 
least 33 percent of world GDP.70 
Third, the Rule of 7 is a pragmatic formula.  It is meant to 
alleviate some of the applicant’s cost and burden of having to 
prove the existence of a well-known mark in every country in the 
WTO.  Such a country-by-country requirement for all 159 WTO 
countries would likely be cost-prohibitive and would deter 
trademark holders from even applying for a GTM.  Instead of 159 
countries, the trademark holder seeking a GTM would have to 
prove well-known status in only 7 countries (2 from Category A 
and 5 from Category B). 
Of course, the ultimate formula adopted by the WTO might be 
different from the Rule of 7.  The important point is not the exact 
formula, but what it represents.  The requirements of proving the 
fame of a mark could be made easier or harder—depending on 
what countries viewed as the better approach.  The Rule of 7 is an 
example of an approach that attempts to balance (i) the interest of 
reserving the GTM for truly global marks and (ii) the costs and 
practicalities of proving the fame of a mark in many countries 
around the world.  The threshold for establishing the global fame 
of a mark should not be set so low that even marks with only 
regional fame can qualify.  On the other hand, the threshold 
should not be set too high—such as proving fame in all 159 
countries—that it would be cost-prohibitive for applicants.  The 
Rule of 7 strikes a balance. 
4.2.2. GTM Application Process 
As depicted in Figure 4 below, the first step in the application 
                                                          
(by adding the GDP figures from the Top 30 countries and dividing them by the 
total world GDP figure).  See 2012 GDP list, supra note 63. 
69  The figure is calculated by adding the GDP from the two countries with 
the lowest GDP in Category A (China and Japan) and the five countries with the 
lowest GDP in Category B (Taiwan, Austria, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, 
and Venezuela), then dividing that number by the world GDP figure.  See id. 
70  The figure is calculated by adding the GDP from the U.S. and the country 
with the lowest GDP in Category A (Japan) and the five countries with the lowest 
GDP in Category B (Taiwan, Austria, South Africa, United Arab Emirates, and 
Venezuela), then dividing that number by the world GDP figure.  See id. 
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process is that a trademark holder files a GTM application 
electronically in the IB of WIPO or in a designated national office.  
The electronic databases of the IB and the designated national 
offices will be coordinated.  The GTM application can be the first 
application filed for a new mark, or it can be a subsequent filing 
for an existing mark (including with Paris priority for applications 
filed within a six-month period after the first filing).71  
 
 
FIGURE 4. PATHWAY 1 FOR GTM REGISTRATION 
 
 In the application, the trademark holder is required to aver, 
with supporting documentation, that (i) its trademark is well-
known in seven countries to satisfy the Rule of 7 (“Statement of 
Fame”) and (ii) it has conducted an international search of its 
trademark and believes it has priority over the trademark as of a 
specified date (“Statement of Priority”).72  As to the Statement of 
                                                          
71  For more on the Paris priority, see infra note 86 and accompanying text. 
72  The GTM Treaty or regulations would set forth acceptable evidence of 
fame, such as evidence showing: (i) high volume of or revenues from sales of 
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Priority, the trademark holder would have a duty to conduct an 
international search of its mark and to disclose the entity that 
performed the search (which could be itself), the extent of the 
search, and any known prior users of the mark or other marks 
likely to cause confusion.  If the trademark holder has national 
registrations of the mark, those registrations can be used as 
evidence of priority in those countries where the mark was already 
registered. 
As depicted in Figure 4, the next step in the process is that the 
IB or the trademark office in which the application is filed would 
begin to conduct the international examination of the mark.  The 
IB would focus on two main criteria:  (i) the priority of the 
trademark holder to the mark internationally and (ii) the fame of 
the mark under the Rule of 7.  Other aspects of trademark 
eligibility, such as lack of distinctiveness of a descriptive mark, 
will also be considered.  The trademark examiner would review 
the application, particularly the Statement of Fame and Statement 
of Priority, along with the supporting documentation submitted 
by the applicant.  The trademark examiner would be able to seek 
information, further evidence, and disclaimers from the applicant 
during the examination process. 
Thus, the International Bureau of WIPO will assume a much 
greater examination role for the GTM than it currently has for 
international applications under the Madrid System.  Under 
Madrid, the IB undertakes primarily an administrative role in 
registering international applications and coordinating requests 
for extension of protection with national offices.73  Under the GTM 
Treaty, however, the IB, along with designated national offices, 
will make legal determinations as to priority and fame of the 
mark.74 
                                                          
countries used to satisfy the Rule of 7, (ii) expenditures on advertising and 
publicity of the trademark during the relevant times in those countries, (iii) actual 
recognition of the trademark in those countries, such as by surveys and national 
media, (iv) the number of consumers of the product or service in those countries, 
and (v) the regions where the product or service is marketed and sold in those 
countries. 
73  See Int’l Trademark Ass’n (INTA), The Madrid Protocol: Impact of U.S. 
Adherence on Trademark Law and Practice, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 1430, 1460–61 (2002) 
[hereinafter INTA] (describing the International Bureau’s role in reviewing 
Madrid applications).   
74  The IB and designated national offices will assume responsibilities akin to 
International Search Authority patent offices under the Patent Cooperation 
Treaty.  See Markus Nolff, The Expanded International Search Procedure: What Will 
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Third, the trademarks in GTM applications will be published 
in the WIPO Gazette at a designated point in time, so that third 
parties with an interest in the same or similar trademark—such as 
senior mark holders—could file oppositions to the registration 
(e.g., to challenge the asserted fame of the mark or the applicant’s 
priority).75  Entities filing oppositions would have access to the 
application and supporting documents for challenge.  Oppositions 
would be adjudicated by the revamped IB of WIPO or by 
designated national trademark offices. 
Fourth, upon the completion of the international examination 
(and any opposition), the trademark office would render a 
decision on the (i) priority and (ii) the fame of the mark under the 
Rule of 7.  Applications that satisfied the GTM criteria would be 
registered on the GTM registry administered by the IB.  
Applications that failed to satisfy the GTM criteria would be 
denied.  Rejected applications could be appealed to a specialized 
GTM appellate court established by the WTO.  In addition, as 
discussed below, the applicant would have the opportunity to 
convert a denied GTM application into a national application, 
while still maintaining the priority date of the GTM application. 
4.2.3. Example of Pathway 1 Application:  Coca-Cola 
The following example shows how Pathway 1 operates.  Coca-
Cola, owner of the world’s third most valuable brand, has 
numerous trademark registrations around the world and is no 
doubt famous in many countries.76  After the GTM Treaty becomes 
effective, Coca-Cola applies for a GTM on its mark “Coca-Cola” 
for beverages, in part to get the ability to bring international 
trademark claims in one forum.  Its Statement of Fame asserts 
well-known status in a variety of countries including the United 
States, European Union, China, Japan, Brazil, Canada, Australia, 
and Mexico—a number more than enough to satisfy the Rule of 7.  
Coca-Cola submits documentary evidence of massive sales and 
                                                          
Be the Next Step in View of TRIPS?, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 717, 719 
(2004) (explaining the role of national patent offices in PCT procedure). 
75  A similar process occurs in the Madrid system.  See INTA, supra note 73, 
at 1460. 
76  See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property 
Law, 1900–2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2209 n.101 (2000) (illustrating the extent of 
the Coca-Cola brand’s notoriety around the country and world); Shankland, supra 
note 65 (ranking Coca-Cola as the third most valuable brand name in the world). 
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advertising in all of these countries sufficient to show fame of its 
mark.  Coca-Cola also submits a Statement of Priority showing its 
international searches of the term “Coca-Cola” and all of its prior 
registrations around the world. 
Based on the submissions, and after publication of Coca-Cola’s 
mark in the WIPO Gazette without opposition, the IB registers 
Coca-Cola’s mark on the Global Registry.  The GTM registration 
provides prima facie evidence that the marks are famous in each of 
the countries for which Coca-Cola submitted evidence to the IB 
during the application process.  It also ensures that Coca-Cola’s 
mark is registered in all 159 countries in the WTO.  Thus, even if 
Coca-Cola had not registered its mark in some WTO countries 
before, the GTM registration would ensure that all WTO countries 
protect the mark as a registered mark. 
4.2.4. GTM Registration and Scope of Rights in Countries 
If a GTM application is approved, the trademark is registered 
on the international registry as a Global Trade Mark and is entitled 
to protection in all member countries.  Under the Treaty, countries 
must treat the GTM registration as establishing trademark rights 
(subject to any defenses).  The level of protection required under 
the Treaty will differ depending on whether the registrant had 
submitted evidence of fame of the mark in that country.  As 
explained below, the GTM is to be treated as presumptively 
famous in all countries that the applicant used to satisfy the Rule 
of 7.  However, other countries (for which no direct evidence of 
fame was presented) will have the discretion under the GTM 
Treaty whether to treat the GTM as famous within the country’s 
borders.  If the GTM is not treated as famous in a country, it still 
must be treated as a registered trademark, with all the benefits and 
protections a registered mark receives. 
4.2.4.1. Prima Facie Evidence of Fame in Rule of 7 Countries 
In those countries used by the GTM registrant to satisfy the 
Rule of 7, the registration of the GTM is treated as prima facie 
evidence of the well-known status of the mark.  If the defendant 
does not produce evidence or reason to discredit the GTM holder’s 
submission to satisfy the Rule of 7, the GTM registration should be 
deemed sufficient proof of the well-known status of the mark in all 
those countries relied on by the GTM registrant.  For example, in 
the above example, Coca-Cola established fame in the United 
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States, European Union, China, Japan, Brazil, Canada, Australia, 
and Mexico.  The primary benefit of having a well-known mark is 
the ability to bring claims against dilution. 
4.2.4.2. Discretion to Consider GTM Registration as Evidence of 
Worldwide or Transborder Reputation 
The more difficult issue is whether the GTM Treaty should 
create any evidentiary presumption in other countries for which 
the GTM registrant did not provide any direct evidence of the 
fame of the mark during the registration process.  In other words, 
beyond the seven countries used to satisfy the Rule of 7, should 
other countries treat the GTM as presumptively famous based on 
the GTM registration? 
At least initially, this Article proposes that countries be given 
the discretion whether to treat the GTM registration as prima facie 
evidence of well-known status in other jurisdictions outside those 
countries used to satisfy the Rule of 7.  Some countries might do 
so, based on the notion that a showing of fame of a mark in three 
continents and markets totaling over twenty percent of world 
GDP—some of which markets may be nearby to the country in 
question—provides circumstantial evidence the mark is also well-
known within their borders.  Indeed, some countries have already 
adopted such a principle under the concept of “transborder 
reputation” of a mark in foreign jurisdictions.77 
Other countries, however, may decide to require 
individualized showings of well-known status in each case in 
which the GTM is litigated, without giving any evidentiary weight 
to the GTM registration.  In these countries, the GTM registration 
would establish prima facie evidence of the validity of the 
registered mark, but the countries could decide to treat the marks 
as ordinary marks, absent a more particularized showing of fame. 
Granted, the suggested approach means that the same 
registered GTM might be famous in some countries of the WTO, 
                                                          
77  India, for example, recognizes transborder reputation.  See Sanjeev Davé, 
TRIPs: International Trademark Law that Promotes Global Trade, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 458, 460 (2001) (describing a court case where the Delphi High Court’s 
decision was consistent with TRIPS art. 16.2, finding that the U.S. corporation 
plaintiff “was entitled to the benefit of the marks’ transborder reputation . . .”); 
Robert J. Gutowski, The Marriage of Intellectual Property and International Trade in 
the TRIPS Agreement: Strange Bedfellows or a Match Made in Heaven?, 47 BUFF. L. 
REV. 713, 728–29 (1999). 
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but not others.78  In this respect, the proposed GTM might not 
achieve uniformity of treatment as to the fame of the underlying 
mark in all jurisdictions.  Yet this varied treatment of fame strikes 
me as fairer and more consistent with principles of trademark. The 
fact that a mark is famous in, for example, sixty percent of WTO 
countries does not necessarily mean that it is famous in the 
remaining forty percent.  The GTM mark holder would still be able 
to prove the fame of the mark in the remaining forty percent, but it 
would not be entitled to a presumption of fame based merely on 
the GTM registration.  In all events, however, the GTM registration 
would qualify the underlying mark to protection as a trademark in 
all WTO countries.  Whether the GTM received heightened 
protections accorded to famous marks would depend on a case-
by-case examination of fame. 
4.3. Pathway 2:  “Intent to Develop” a Global Trade Mark 
Pathway 2 allows an alternative way of registering a GTM by 
declaring an “intent to develop a Global Trade Mark.”  This route 
would be attractive to start-up companies intending to become 
international in reach, and current international businesses whose 
marks were not yet well-known enough to satisfy the Rule of 7 
under Pathway 1.  The route is similar to the popular “intent-to-
use” application under § 1(b) of the U.S. Lanham Act.79 
Figure 5 below summarizes Pathway 2.  First, an entity would 
file a GTM application to establish priority over a new mark, along 
                                                          
78  A similar issue arises in the context of the Community Trade Mark in the 
EU.  The Court of Justice of the European Union has held that the fame of a CTM 
need only be established in one country of the EU.  See Case C-301/07, PAGO 
Int’l GmbH v. Tirolmilch Registrierte Genossenschaft mbH, 2009 E.C.R. I-9429, 29 
(“As the present case concerns a Community trade mark with a reputation 
throughout the territory of a Member State, namely Austria, the view may be 
taken, regard being had to the circumstances of the main proceedings, that the 
territorial requirement imposed by Article 9(1)(c) of the regulation is satisfied.”).  
Yet such a showing of fame in one EU country does not necessarily mean that the 
CTM holder could assert a dilution claim in every EU country: the CTM holder 
would unlikely be able to show dilution of its mark in a country where it was not 
famous (meaning the defendant’s activity would not be detrimental to the 
distinctive character of the mark).  Thus, the CTM would have varying levels of 
enforceability and rights depending on how much fame the CTM holder had 
established in a particular EU member.  The proposed GTM adopts a similar 
approach but focuses on the threshold showing of fame (instead of the question 
of dilution or infringement of rights). 
79  See 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b) (1946) (providing for the “Application for bona fide 
intention to use trademark.”). 
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with a Statement of Priority.  The key difference from Pathway 1 is 
that the applicant can delay the filing of a Statement of Fame for a 
period of 10 years from the filing date.  Within the ten-year period, 
the applicant would have to file, with supporting documentation, 
a Statement of Fame averring that it owns a trademark that is well-
known in 7 countries to satisfy the Rule of 7.  Once that is 
established, the GTM would be registered.  During the ten-year 
period while the mark holder is establishing the fame of its mark, 
the trademark holder would maintain priority over the mark. 
 
FIGURE 5. PATHWAY 2 FOR GTM REGISTRATION 
  
4.3.1. Threshold Requirement:  The Rule of 7 Delayed 
The threshold requirement under the Rule of 7 is the same 
under Pathway 2.  As depicted in Figure 5, the only major 
difference is that, under Pathway 2, the applicant does not have to 
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countries, at the time of filing.  Instead, the applicant has a 10-year 
period in which to file a Statement of Fame.  The other 
requirements, such as the Statement of Priority, would still apply 
at the time of filing the application under Pathway 2.  Once the 
Statement of Fame is filed, the IB will decide whether to accept or 
reject the application. 
Alternatively, if WTO countries felt that ten years would be too 
long to lock up a potential GTM before proof of fame is required, 
the time periods can be staggered.  For example, the GTM Treaty 
could require:  (1) proof of fame in at least two countries by Year 5; 
(2) proof of fame in at least four countries by Year 8; and then (3) 
proof of fame in at least seven countries by Year 10.  If the 
applicant failed any of these benchmarks, the registration would 
be denied. 
4.3.2. Example of Intent-to-Develop Application:  Twitter 
The following example demonstrates how Pathway 2 operates.  
Imagine that even before launching its service, Twitter filed for an 
“intent to develop” a GTM in the mark “Twitter,” thus preserving 
its priority to the mark as of the filing date.  In addition to paying 
the $15,000 application fee, Twitter included its Statement of 
Priority with the application, but did not need to attach any 
Statement of Fame at the time.  The mark is published in the WIPO 
Gazette.  As a precaution, Twitter also filed a U.S. registration for 
the mark within the six-month Paris priority period.  After just a 
few years, Twitter became a worldwide sensation and one of the 
most visited social networking sites in the world.  Within the ten-
year grace period allowed under the GTM Treaty, Twitter filed its 
Statement of Fame showing millions of registered users and 
“tweets,” along with popular media references to “Twitter,” in the 
U.S., Canada, EU, Japan, Australia, Indonesia, Brazil, and 
Venezuela.  After reviewing Twitter’s evidence of fame, the IB of 
WIPO determines the mark satisfies the Rule of 7 and registers it 
as a GTM on the Global Registry.  Upon GTM registration, Twitter 
has a registered mark in all WTO countries—even though it only 
filed two applications (U.S. national and GTM international 
applications) under this scenario. 
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4.4. Other Registration Issues 
4.4.1. Registration Fees:  $15,000 Per Application 
The GTM application will require a fee.  The fee should be set 
at a relatively high amount—say, at $15,000 per application.  That 
figure is 150 times the fee amount for an international application 
under Madrid ($100).80  So why the high fee?  One reason in setting 
the fee high is to weed out non-meritorious applications or 
potential “name-squatters” desiring to warehouse marks.  The fee 
should not be set so low that it would invite frivolous or bad faith 
applicants, as was the case with domain name registrations.  While 
$15,000 probably would deter frivolous filers, legitimate 
businesses, including start-ups and individuals, should be able to 
afford $15,000 if they have a business with global potential.  
Another reason to set the fee high is to help offset the 
administrative costs of running the GTM system, including the 
ICGTM and registry.  For example, two hundred applications for 
the GTM would earn $3 million.  Of course, the filing fee could be 
set even higher if the administrative costs of running the GTM 
system are too costly. 
4.4.2. Term and Renewal of Registration 
The basic GTM registration would last for ten years.  Every ten 
years, the GTM registration must be renewed with the payment of 
maintenance fees. 
4.4.3. Languages and Foreign Equivalents 
Under the Treaty, a GTM registration would provide the 
registrant the rights to the underlying mark not only in the 
language of origin, but also in foreign languages.  Thus, a third 
party in a foreign country could not commercially use for the same 
type of goods or services a famous mark—let’s say Starbucks—
simply by translating or transliterating the English words “star” 
and “bucks” into a foreign language, such as “Xingbake” in 
Chinese.81  The mark registered under a GTM would be protected 
                                                          
80   Madrid FAQs, USPTO, 
http://www.uspto.gov/trademarks/law/madrid/madridfaqs.jsp#q7 (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
81  See Stephanie M. Greene, Protecting Well-Known Marks in China: Challenges 
for Foreign Mark Holders, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 371, 384–85 (2008) (describing a 1999 case 
in which Starbucks sued the owner of a café in Qingdao, China); see also Daniel 
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in its foreign equivalents, including phonetically (i.e., its sounds) 
and semantically (i.e., its meaning).  By the same token, the GTM 
Treaty will recognize the doctrine of foreign equivalents, which 
bars giving trademark status to foreign words that are generic in 
their country of origin.82  Thus, an applicant could not pick a 
generic term in Japanese (such as otokoyama for a type of sake) and 
try to register it as a GTM for that type of product or service 
simply by transliterating the symbol for the term into English. 
4.4.4. Nice Classification of Goods and Services 
The GTM Treaty will adopt the classification system for goods 
and services recognized by the Nice Agreement.83  Currently, 
eighty-four countries are members of the Nice Agreement.84  And 
many more trademark offices follow the Nice classification system.  
As WIPO explains, “the trademark offices of at least 147 States, as 
well as the International Bureau of WIPO, the African Intellectual 
Property Organization (OAPI), the African Regional Intellectual 
Property Organization (ARIPO), the Benelux Organisation for 
Intellectual Property (BOIP) and the Office for Harmonization in 
the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) (OHIM) of the 
European Communities, actually use the Classification.”85  
                                                          
C.K. Chow, Trademark Squatting and the Limits of the Famous Marks Doctrine in 
China, GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 16–27) 
(describing how popular Western trademarks are often transliterated into 
Chinese language equivalents by third parties), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2443923##. 
82  See Otokoyama Co. v. Wine of Japan Import, Inc., 175 F.3d 266, 271 (2d 
Cir. 1999) (holding that the Japanese word for a type of sake is generic in Japan 
and therefore should be considered generic in the United States).  But see Serge 
Krimnus, The Doctrine of Foreign Equivalents at Death’s Door, 12 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 
159 (2010) (criticizing doctrine of foreign equivalents). 
83  See generally Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification 
of Goods and Services of the Purposes of the Registration of Marks, June 15, 1957, 
23 U.S.T. 1336, 550 U.N.T.S. 46, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/classification/nice/trtdocs_wo019.html 
[hereinafter Nice Agreement]. 
84   Nice Agreement Contracting Parties, WIPO, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=12 (last 
visited Jan. 25, 2014). 
85   Summary of the Nice Agreement Concerning the International Classification of 
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4.4.5. Relationship with Paris Convention and Madrid System 
The GTM system will be integrated with both the Paris 
Convention and the Madrid System. 
 4.4.5.1. Paris Priority 
Under the GTM Treaty, a new trademark holder can file a 
domestic application first and then seek a GTM registration (under 
Pathway 2) within six months, while preserving the Paris priority 
date (the date of the first filing) for the GTM registration.86  Thus, 
the date of the first domestic filing will apply also to the 
application of the GTM for the purposes of establishing priority to 
the mark.  Conversely, one can file a GTM application first and 
then file national applications within the Paris priority period.  By 
contrast, for famous marks already in existence (Pathway 1), the 
need for using Paris priority may be no longer necessary or 
applicable.  Presumably, the famous marks already have multiple 
national registrations in various countries of the world.  Moreover, 
the Paris Convention establishes priority for a well-known mark in 
countries as of the date the mark became famous in respective 
countries.87  A GTM applicant can rely on the dates of priority 
established by its prior national registrations and fame. 
4.4.5.2. Madrid System and Conversion of Failed GTM 
Applications 
The GTM system will be integrated with the Madrid System.  
One of the options on the Madrid application form will be the 
GTM.  In addition, the registry for the GTM would be included in 
the same searchable database as international registrations under 
Madrid. The GTM system will also permit applicants to convert to 
the Madrid system, should the GTM application fail for some 
                                                          
86  See Paris Convention, supra note 14, at art. 4 (“Any person who has duly 
filed an application . . . for the registration of . . . a trademark, in one of the 
countries of the Union, . . . shall enjoy, for the purpose of filing in the other 
countries, a right of priority during the periods hereinafter fixed. . . .  The periods 
of priority referred to above shall be . . . six months for . . . trademarks.”). 
87  See id. at art. 6bis (“The countries of the Union undertake . . . to refuse or 
to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trademark which 
constitutes a reproduction, an imitation, or a translation, liable to create 
confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of the country of 
registration or use to be well known in that country as being already the mark of 
a person entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or 
similar goods.”). 
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reason.  This process of conversion will be similar to the process of 
transformation under the Madrid Protocol that allows applicants 
to transform into national applications an international 
registration that was successfully challenged under a “central 
attack” during the first five years of registration.88  For new 
trademarks that fail to receive GTM status, the applicant could 
elect, within three months of a final rejection, to convert the GTM 
application into an application under the Madrid system—all 
while preserving the priority date established by the GTM 
application.  For existing trademarks (many of which are already 
registered in multiple countries), the conversion of a failed GTM 
application probably will not be needed. 
5. GLOBAL ENFORCEMENT AND POST-REGISTRATION ISSUES 
The GTM will be global in scope and enforceable in all of the 
approved national courts of WTO countries.  A major benefit of 
the GTM system is that it enables national courts to hear 
transnational trademark disputes and authorize transborder 
remedies, including injunctions spanning multiple countries in the 
WTO.  The efficiencies in adjudicating transnational disputes 
involving GTMs are potentially substantial. 
5.1. Litigation in Member Countries 
5.1.1. International Lawsuits in National Courts 
A GTM can be enforced just as any other registered trademark 
in national courts.  The WTO will approve the countries that can 
hear GTM disputes based on each country’s maintenance of an 
adequate court system.  The threshold for approval will be set low, 
but it will nevertheless require satisfaction of basic requirements of 
an independent judiciary, fidelity to the rule of law, and evidence 
of sufficient judicial resources to handle trademark lawsuits.89 
                                                          
88  See Madrid Protocol, supra note 25, at arts. 6(3), 9quinquies (“Where, in 
the event that the international registration is cancelled at the request of the 
Office of origin . . . in respect of all or some of the goods and services listed in the 
said registration, the person who was the holder of the international registration 
files an application for the registration of the same mark with the Office of any of 
the Contracting Parties in the territory of which the international registration had 
effect, that application shall be treated as if it had been filed on the date of the 
international registration.”). 
89  WTO countries are already subject to several basic requirements of civil 
procedure to handle IP cases.  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at arts. 42–48      
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National courts will have jurisdiction over a GTM dispute if 
some infringing activity—e.g., manufacture, transport, 
distribution, sales—occurs within the country’s borders.  In 
addition, countries will have jurisdiction over a claim if the 
underlying infringing activity produces “substantial effects” in 
that country.90  Under the current system, transnational trademark 
disputes must be litigated in several different countries, given the 
reluctance of countries to entertain jurisdiction over foreign 
trademarks.91  The GTM avoids piecemeal litigation (i.e., lawsuits 
in several countries over related conduct involving the same 
trademark) and achieves greater efficiency in resolving 
transnational disputes. 
5.1.2. Transborder Remedies and Injunctions 
Another advantage of the GTM system is that it will authorize 
national courts to issue transborder remedies for infringing 
activity that spans several countries.  Damages calculations can 
include losses from infringing activity in all member countries in 
which the GTM in question was infringed.  In addition, the court 
will have the power to issue a transborder injunction against the 
infringer for all infringements of the GTM in WTO countries.92 
                                                          
(stating the various civil procedures that WTO members must recognize). 
90  See generally AM. LAW INST., RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW (THIRD): THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1986) (“Subject to § 403, a 
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to (1) . . . (c) conduct outside its 
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory.”).  
For example, the United States allows jurisdiction in cases where foreign 
trademark infringement results in substantial effects in the United States.  See 
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283–87 (1952) (holding that a United 
States district court has jurisdiction to award relief to an American corporation 
against acts of trademark infringement in a foreign country by a United States 
citizen). 
91  See DANIEL C.K. CHOW & EDWARD LEE, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY: PROBLEMS, CASES, AND MATERIALS 819–21 (2006); Kerry J. Begley, 
Multinational Patent Enforcement: What the “Parochial” United States Can Learn from 
Past and Present European Initiatives, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 521 (2007) (discussing 
U.S. and EU approaches to jurisdiction over foreign patent claims); David R. 
Toraya, Note, Federal Jurisdiction over Foreign Copyright Infringement Actions—An 
Unsolicited Reply to Professor Nimmer, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 1165, 1178–80 (1985) 
(discussing bases to deny jurisdiction over claims related to foreign patents and 
foreign trademarks). 
92  The EU recognizes EU-wide injunctions for infringement of the 
Community Trade Mark.  See Case C-235/09, DHL Express France SAS v. 
Chronopost SA, 2011 E.C.R. I-2825, ¶ 44 (holding that a court should usually 
grant an EU-wide injunction for infringements of the Community Trade Mark).  
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5.1.3. Example of GTM Litigation:  Adidas 
The following hypothetical example illustrates the potential 
advantages of how the GTM can be enforced.  Imagine that 
Adidas, the German manufacturer of sports merchandise, has 
determined that its Adidas goods are being counterfeited by 
Copycat Defendant in several countries in Asia.  Counterfeit 
Adidas goods have been shipped to the European Union, the 
United States, and other parts of the world.  Adidas owns a 
registered GTM for its mark and logo.  Under the GTM Treaty, 
Adidas can bring a trademark suit against Copycat Defendant in 
the European Union—or any of the other countries where the 
infringing goods were made or distributed.  Adidas sues Copycat 
Defendant in a designated court in the European Union and is 
successful in obtaining a verdict against Defendant for 
counterfeiting.  The court in the European Union authorizes 
damages for all of the infringing activity, plus a transborder 
injunction against Copycat Defendant in all WTO countries.  With 
the injunction, Adidas is able to enlist the local authorities in the 
various Asian countries to shut down the known counterfeiting 
operations of Copycat Defendant.  With this “one-stop-shopping” 
in a GTM court, Adidas can file one lawsuit to address all of the 
Copycat Defendant’s infringing activity around the world.  By 
contrast, the current system offers no such streamlined process.  
Instead, Adidas must file trademark lawsuits in the European 
Union and every single country where infringing activity takes 
place. 
5.2. International Exhaustion and Trademark Exceptions 
The GTM will be governed by a principle of international 
exhaustion, meaning that the lawful first sale of a trademarked 
good anywhere in the WTO will exhaust the GTM owner’s 
distribution and importation rights to the good in question.93  For 
example, if Adidas had a GTM and sold gym bags with the Adidas 
mark on it in Australia, Adidas’s distribution rights to the sold 
gym bags would be exhausted internationally.  After the lawful 
first sale in any WTO country, the gym bags can be resold by their 
purchasers anywhere in the world, even at cheaper prices in 
                                                          
93  For a discussion of international versus national exhaustion, see Irene 
Calboli, Market Integration and (the Limits of) the First Sale Rule in North American 
and European Trademark Law, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1246 (2011). 
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competition with Adidas’s goods.  International exhaustion allows 
parallel imports or so-called gray market goods.  Some may 
question the adoption of the expansive approach of international 
exhaustion for the GTM.  However, international exhaustion is the 
most consistent with the overall philosophy of the Global Trade 
Mark—i.e., that it is one global trademark in a global market.  In 
addition, some of the major trading countries, like the United 
States and European Union, already adopt exhaustion principles 
for trademark law that are more expansive than national 
exhaustion.94 
The GTM Treaty will also recognize exceptions to trademark 
rights, including for fair use, parody, and noncommercial uses of 
marks, as well as for free speech concerns.  The precise exceptions 
for inclusion will require further study and debate.  The exceptions 
to dilution of famous marks under U.S. law provide a good start.95 
5.3. Loss of GTM Rights 
The GTM Treaty will establish standards governing the loss of 
GTM rights.  Given the well-known status of the GTM in a 
significant number of markets, and the heightened protection that 
such status merits under Paris and TRIPS, the GTM Treaty will set 
a high bar before a registrant may lose GTM rights to its well-
known mark.  (Of course, loss of GTM rights does not necessarily 
mean that the registrant loses its national trademark rights to the 
mark.) 
5.3.1. Loss of Fame Below the Rule of 7 Threshold 
One way in which a registered GTM can be invalidated is if the 
registration is not supported by fame to meet the threshold under 
the Rule of 7.  Once a GTM is registered, the burden will lie with a 
                                                          
94  See id. at 1262–71 (describing the United States approach of international 
exhaustion in trademark law). 
95  See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3) (“The following shall not be actionable . . . (A) 
Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or facilitation of such 
fair use, of a famous mark by another person other than as a designation of 
source for the person’s own goods or services, including use in connection with—
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare goods or 
services; or (ii) Identifying and parodying, criticizing, or commenting upon the 
famous mark owner or the goods or services of the famous mark owner.  (B) All 
forms of news reporting and news commentary.  (C) Any noncommercial use of a 
mark.”); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing Defenses in Trademark Law, 13 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 99, 112–24 (2009). 
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challenger—either in a trademark lawsuit or in an opposition 
before the IB—to provide some evidence to discredit or disprove 
the registrant’s showing of fame.  The challenger could attempt to 
do so by, for example, submitting more recent evidence showing 
the registrant’s lack of sales, minimal advertising expenditures, or 
lack of general recognition of the mark in the country in question.  
Once such a showing by a challenger is made, the registrant would 
have the opportunity to rebut the challenge. 
If the challenger is successful in establishing the lack of fame of 
the mark in one of the countries used to satisfy the Rule of 7, such 
that fame is established in only six or fewer countries, the GTM 
registration would be in jeopardy of cancellation.  However, the 
registrant would be given the opportunity of complying with the 
Rule of 7 by establishing the fame of its mark in another country of 
the Top 30 GDP countries not yet used by the registrant. 
In the end, if the Rule of 7 is not satisfied for the GTM in 
question, the registration for the mark will be canceled.  If the 
challenge is successful in a national court or the IB, the registrant 
would have the opportunity for appeal through the national court 
system.  If cancellation of the GTM registration is upheld on 
appeal, the registrant may elect to convert the invalidated GTM 
registration into an application for registration in national 
trademark offices, with the same priority date as the GTM 
application.96 
5.3.2. GTM Genericide 
Just as with any trademark, the GTM will be susceptible to 
genericide, meaning that the primary significance of the mark in 
the minds of consumers denotes the type of product or service, 
rather than its source.97  An alternative standard is that the term 
has become “customary in common language as the common 
name for such goods or services in the territory.”98  Famous 
examples of genericide include thermos, yo-yo, nylon, zipper, 
                                                          
96  The Madrid Protocol recognizes a similar process of conversion.  See 
Madrid Protocol, supra note 25, at art. 9quinquies (describing how to convert an 
international to a national trademark application). 
97  See 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (“At any time if the registered mark becomes the 
generic name for the goods or services”); Murphy Door Bed Co. v. Interior Sleep 
Sys., Inc., 874 F.2d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 1989) (being generic to a “substantial majority 
of the public”). 
98  TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 24(6). 
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escalator, and aspirin.  A generic mark cannot be protected as a 
trademark. 
The standard for establishing genericide of a registered GTM 
will be higher than required for an ordinary mark.  The challenger 
must prove that the GTM is generic not just in one country, but in 
a threshold number of countries (e.g., four of the seven countries 
used in the Rule 7 by the registrant).  A GTM will not be 
considered generic and invalid unless the threshold of countries 
for genericide is met.  If sufficient proof establishes that the GTM 
is generic in a country, but not in the threshold of countries, the 
GTM will be considered non-enforceable just in that country 
where the mark is generic.  In all other WTO countries, the mark 
will be enforceable.  Moreover, within a five-year period after any 
determination of genericide of a GTM within a country, the GTM 
registrant may attempt to “revive” the secondary meaning of the 
mark by advertising, sales, and promotion.  In such case, the 
registrant must submit, to the IB, evidence that the mark is no 
longer generic in that country, as well as evidence of fame 
sufficient to satisfy the Rule of 7.  A GTM will be canceled as a 
generic mark only if it has been shown to be generic in the 
threshold number of countries. 
5.3.3. Abandonment 
A registered GTM will be subject to a higher standard of 
abandonment as well.  Abandonment is a doctrine that deems a 
trademark to be effectively relinquished by its owner, such as if 
the owner fails to use the mark for three consecutive years without 
intention of resuming its use.99  Abandonment of a GTM will not 
arise simply based on a showing of abandonment within one 
country.  Instead, a challenger must prove that the GTM in 
question has not been used in a threshold number of countries for 
an uninterrupted period of three years or more.100  Once such a 
showing is made, a presumption of abandonment is raised.  The 
GTM owner will have the opportunity to rebut the presumption, 
such as by showing that it intended to use the GTM in the 
                                                          
99  See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 19 (“[U]se is required to 
maintain a registration, the registration may be cancelled only after an 
uninterrupted period of at least three years of non-use”); Electro Source, LLC v. 
Brandess-Kalt-Aetna Group, Inc., 458 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir. 2006). 
100  Cf. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 11, at art. 19 (stating the minimum 
standard of “an uninterrupted period of at least three years of non-use”). 
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challenged countries (as evidenced in business preparations, 
planning, or the like) or that it had legitimate reason for non-use. 
The GTM Treaty will not recognize abandonment by so-called 
“naked licensing.”  The doctrine, originated in the United States, 
holds that the trademark holder’s lack of quality control over 
licensees of the mark may constitute abandonment of the mark.101  
A number of scholars have argued for jettisoning the naked 
licensing doctrine as ad hoc, ineffective, and unnecessary, 
although some still believe in its usefulness.102  Only a few U.S. 
cases have ever found naked licensing.103  Given its debatable 
value, the GTM Treaty will not recognize the bar against naked 
licensing. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Businesses commonly seek intellectual property protection 
around the world, yet there is no global form of IP protection.  
This Article offers a model for how WTO countries can establish a 
Global Trade Mark system for a narrow class of “super famous” 
marks.  The proposal is meant as a way for countries to 
experiment with developing transnational forms of IP rights, in 
order to develop a more efficient and sensible approach for today’s 
                                                          
101  See Barcamerica Int’l USA Trust v. Tyfield Importers, Inc., 289 F.3d 589, 
596 (9th Cir. 2002) (stating that if there is a failure to exercise adequate quality 
control, ‘‘a court may find that the trademark owner has abandoned the 
trademark, in which case the owner would be estopped from asserting rights to 
the trademark.’’); Dawn Donut Company, Inc. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 
F.2d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1959); Franchised Stores of N.Y., Inc. v. Winter, 394 F.2d 664, 
668–69 (2d Cir. 1968). 
102  See, e.g., JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M MCJOHN, LICENSING OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 11.03 (2008); Katya Assaf, Brand Fetishism, 43 CONN. L. 
REV. 83, 112–13 (2010); Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern 
Trademark Licensing, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 341, 395-400 (2007); Noel Gillespie, Licensing 
and the “Related Companies” Doctrine, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 209, 210–12 
(2001); W.J. Keating, Promotional Trademark Licensing: A Concept Whose Time Has 
Come, 89 DICK. L. REV. 363, 365 (1985); Rudolph J. Kuss, Comment, The Naked 
Licensing Doctrine Exposed: How Courts Interpret the Lanham Act to Require Licensors 
to Police Their Licensees & Why this Requirement Conflicts with Modern Licensing 
Realities & the Goals of Trademark Law, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 361, 381–82 
(2005); Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the 
“Quality Control Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 557 
(1992).  But see, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND 
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 18.61 (4th ed. 2013) (espousing strict enforcement of 
quality control requirement).  
103  See DRATLER, supra note 102, § 11.03 (describing how courts have 
enforced the control requirement in very few litigated cases). 
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global market than the current piecemeal, territorial system of 
intellectual property.  The proposal is not intended for adoption in 
all IP treaties, but, instead, is meant as a way for IP policymakers 
and countries to experiment with an alternative global approach to 
IP protection in a narrow area of law.  Success or failure of such a 
global system will provide valuable information for countries to 
evaluate future efforts to deal with globalization.   
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